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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2003, Felipe Montes illegally crossed the border from Mexico
into the United States and traveled to Sparta, North Carolina to find
work on Christmas tree farms.' While living and working in Sparta,
Felipe married a local woman named Marie and started a family.2 The
Montes family was not picture-perfect and had its fair share of financial
troubles.' They found themselves strapped for cash at times due to a
combination of Felipe's seasonal employment and injuries that kept him
* J.D. Candidate 2014, University of Miami School of Law; LL.M. in Taxation Candidate
2014, University of Miami School of Law; B.A. 2011, Wofford College. I would like to thank my
faculty advisor, Bernard Perlmutter, as well as the rest of the University of Miami Children &
Youth Law Clinic for the inspiration and direction during my research. I am extremely grateful for
the love and support of my family, and I extend a special thanks to my mom, Connie Byrd, for her
essential feedback in developing and editing this paper.
1. Seth Freed Wessler, A Deported Father Wins a Long, Painfid Fight to Keep His Kids,
COLORLINES (Nov. 28, 2012, 9:53 AM), http://colorlines.com/archives/2012/1 1/nc judgereunites
deportedfather withthreeus citizenchildren.html [hereinafter Wessler, Deported Father
Wins].
2. Id.
3. Id.
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from working.' Additionally, Marie had mental health problems and
struggled with drug use.' In fact, the Department of Social Services
investigated Marie and Felipe multiple times due to allegations that the
couple neglected their children.6 In each instance, however, the Depart-
ment's assessment did not reveal any evidence of neglect, and the chil-
dren remained in Felipe and Marie's custody.7
Felipe could not obtain a driver's license because he was an
undocumented immigrant and he accumulated a series of traffic viola-
tions.' As a result of his convictions, in 2010, Felipe was deported to
Mexico and forced to leave his two young children, Isaiah and Adrian,
and his pregnant wife in Sparta.' Marie struggled to support herself and
her family after Felipe's deportation.10 She was very ill and had only her
monthly disability payments with which to support her family." With
Felipe gone, Marie was unable to physically and financially support her
children, and within two months of the birth of their third child, Angel,
welfare officials removed all three children from Marie's care. 1 2 The
children were placed with foster families who hoped to adopt them, and
the Department of Social Services moved to terminate Marie and
Felipe's parental rights.13 At the time, Felipe was living in Tamaulipas,
Mexico with his aunt and uncle.14 He asked the welfare officials to send
his sons to live with him, but the agency refused, claiming that his home
was inadequate for the young children."
Sadly, Felipe's loss is not unique. The Applied Research Center
conducted a study, finding that in late 2011 there were at least 5,100
children of deported or detained parents living in foster care in the
United States.16 Another report showed that between July 1, 2010, and
September 31, 2012, over 204,000 immigrant parents of United States
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-302(a) (2012) (Upon receipt of a report of abuse,
abandonment, or neglect, the Department of Social Services "shall make a prompt and thorough
assessment ... in order to ascertain the facts of the case, the extent of the abuse or neglect, and the
... harm to the juvenile, in order to determine whether protective services should be provided or
the complaint filed as a petition.").
8. Wessler, Deported Father Wins, supra note 1.
9. Id.
10. Seth Freed Wessler, Deported Dad Begs North Carolina to Give Him Back His Children,
COLORUINEs (Feb. 14, 2012, 10:38 AM), http://colorlines.com/archives/2012/02/deported-dad_
begs-north carolinanot-put-kidsjintoadoption.html [hereinafter Wessler, Deported Dad Begs].
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Wessler, Deported Father Wins, supra note 1.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. SETH FREED WESSLER, SHATTERED FAmLIEs: THE PERILOUS INTERSECTION OF
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citizen children were deported." Fortunately for Felipe, his story
became national news.' Over 21,000 people signed a petition supported
by Presente.org, a national Latino advocacy organization, demanding
Felipe's children be reunited with him.19 The Mexican Consulate in
North Carolina petitioned federal immigration authorities, and the Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") granted Felipe permission to
enter the United States for ninety days to allow him to participate in the
court hearing where a judge would determine if his children could return
to Mexico with him.2 0 In late November 2012, Judge Michael Duncan of
North Carolina ordered that the three children be returned to Felipe for a
"trial placement." 2 1 After a long and difficult battle, Felipe and his chil-
dren traveled home to Tamaulipas, Mexico in March 2013.22
Not all detained and deported parents of United States citizen chil-
dren are as fortunate as Felipe Montes. In fact, when the Mexican Con-
sulate petitioned for Felipe's humanitarian parole that eventually
allowed him to reenter the United States, the Consulate was unable to
cite another instance where someone who had been deported was
allowed to reenter the country. 23 This is one of many instances in which
state child welfare agencies push to terminate the parental rights of
detained, deported, or even merely deportable parents. 24 Instead of prov-
ing that the parent is not fit to care for the child by at least clear and
convincing evidence as law requires,2 5 child welfare agencies argue that
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 4 (Kathryn Duggan, M6nica
Novoa & Rebekah Spicuglia, eds., The Matea Group, trans., 2011).
17. Seth Freed Wessler, Nearly 205K Deportations of Parents of U.S. Citizens in Just Over
Two Years, COLORLINES (Dec. 17, 2012, 9:45 AM), http://colorlines.com/archives/2012/12/us-de
ports.morethan_200kparents.html.
18. Wessler, Deported Father Wins, supra note 1.
19. Seth Freed Wessler, How the 'Best Interest' Bias of Family Court Threatens Immigrant
Parents, COLORLINES (Aug. 8, 2012, 9:27 AM), http://colorlines.com/archives/2012/08/felipebau
tista montes encarnacionbailromeroandthebiasesofbestinterest.html.
20. Seth Freed Wessler, Deported Father Returns to Fight for His Children in Exceptional
Case, COLORLINEs (Aug. 3, 2012, 9:57 AM), http://colorlines.com/archives/2012/08/carrying-
only-a-small-navy.html [hereinafter Wessler, Father Returns].
21. Wessler, Deported Father Wins, supra note 1.
22. Seth Freed Wessler, Felipe Montes Departs the United States for Mexico, with his
Children, COLORLINES (Mar. 22, 2013, 12:24 PM), http://colorlines.com/archives/2013/03/felipe
montes-departsthe-united statesformexico withhischildren.html [hereinafter Wessler,
Father Departs with Children].
23. Wessler, Father Returns, supra note 20.
24. See, e.g., In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d 825 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); In re V.S., 548 S.E.2d 490
(Ga. Ct. App. 2001); In re B. & J., 756 N.W.2d 234 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008); In re Interest of
Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d 74 (Neb. 2009); see also Marcia Yablon-Zug, Separation, Deportation,
Termination, 32 B.C.J.L. & Soc. JUST. 63, 84-86 (2012).
25. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769-70 (holding that the State must prove the
statutory grounds for termination by at least clear and convincing evidence before terminating a
parent's rights).
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it is not in the child's best interest to leave the United States with the
parent.2 6 Even more shocking is the tendency of juvenile court judges to
accept that argument and terminate the parent's rights where the State
did not meet its legal burden.27 While almost all of these terminations
have been overturned on appeal, only a small percentage of cases
involving undocumented immigrant parents are appealed as a result of
the parent's poverty and inability to speak English or Spanish.2 8
In her recent article, Should I Stay or Should I Go: Why Immigra-
tion Reunification Decisions Should Be Based on the Best Interest of the
Child, Professor Marcia Zug suggests that the courts should use a differ-
ent standard in parental rights termination proceedings when a parent's
deportation is probable. 29 She proposes that the fitness standard is appro-
priate when it is not likely that a parent will be deported, but that the
child's best interest standard should be applied when it is probable that a
parent will be deported.30 Professor Zug focuses on the meaning of citi-
zenship and posits that even though there is an established presumption
favoring parental rights, in order to protect the future of democracy,
children's rights should be superior to their parents' rights in situations
where a parent is not a United States citizen." Professor Zug's proposi-
tion begs two questions: (1) whether the fitness standard appropriately
addresses each party's interests; and (2) whether the standard for termi-
nating a parent's rights should shift based on the parent's alien or depor-
26. See, e.g., In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d at 832 ("[T]he termination of the father's parental rights
was based on the possibility that the father could someday be deported and, with her mother's
parental rights also severed, [the child] might be returned to [state] custody or sent to Mexico.");
In re V.S., 548 S.E.2d at 493 (termination of father's parental rights by the juvenile court was
premature where there was less than clear and convincing evidence that he was an unfit parent but
there was a finding that it was in the child's best interest to terminate the father's rights); In re B.
& J., 756 N.W.2d at 238 (The juvenile court wrongfully terminated the parents' rights based on a
finding of "'environmental neglect,' consisting of inadequate sleeping accommodations for the
children in [the parents'] home.").
27. See, e.g., In re V.S., 548 S.E.2d at 493 (juvenile court decision reversed because the State
did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the father was an unfit parent before
terminating his parental rights); In re B. & J., 756 N.W.2d at 238 (The juvenile court wrongfully
terminated the parents' rights where the State argued only "environmental neglect."); In re
Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 87 (juvenile court decision to terminate the mother's parental rights
solely on a finding that it was not in the children's best interest to return with her to Guatemala
was reversed because the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the mother
was an unfit parent).
28. Yablon-Zug, supra note 24, at 98 ("When poor immigrant parents with no proficiency in
English or even Spanish are deported to their home countries, their ability to pursue appeals is
severely curtailed. Most cases that have been appealed involve parents lucky enough to have
acquired exceptional legal assistance prior to deportation.").
29. Marcia Zug, Should I Stay or Should I Go: Why Immigration Reunification Decisions
Should Be Based on the Best Interest of the Child, 2011 BYU L. REv. 1139, 1143 (2011).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1141-44.
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tation status. This Comment addresses both issues, arguing first that
while the State's interest and the child's rights must be considered in
parental rights termination proceedings, that the fitness standard appro-
priately accounts for all parties' interests. This Comment goes on to
address a shifting standard hinged on a parent's alien or deportation sta-
tus by analogizing the proposed shifting standard to two movements in
American history that sought to protect children's best interests, but, in
retrospect, harmed the children and only reflected American biases.
Part II of this Comment will discuss the various parties' rights and
interests in child welfare proceedings. These include a parent's right to
the care and custody of his or her children, the State's interest in the
safety and welfare of children and in keeping its citizens connected to
the United States, a child's best interest, and a child's interest in being
raised by his or her biological parents. Part III of the Comment will
analyze the appropriate balance of the competing interests, exploring
what the best interest of a child involves and where children's rights are
and should be considered and given weight. Part IV explores two move-
ments in United States history that demonstrate the consequences of the
belief that children are better off with traditional American families.
Finally, Part V considers possible remedies to the tension between con-
flicting goals of immigration law and child welfare law.
II. INTERESTS INVOLVED
Clearly grasping each party's interests, the differences between
them, and how they work together is integral to understanding how the
parental fitness standard addresses each interest. In cases involving chil-
dren there is often no obvious "bad guy." Instead there are multiple par-
ties advocating for what they sincerely believe is best for a child.
For example, Felipe Montes wanted his three children to return
with him to Mexico where he believed that they would be sufficiently
cared for.3 2 The child welfare officials, on the other hand, concluded that
sending the children to Mexico to live with their father and his family
would subject the children to unsafe conditions." The attorney
appointed by the court to represent the children's best interest believed
that the children would not have the necessary resources to survive in
Mexico, and that they should remain in the United States with their fos-
ter parents.34 Here, as in most proceedings involving children, there are
32. Wessler, Deported Father Wins, supra note 1.
33. Id.
34. The attorney representing the Montes children was a "best interest" attorney and did not
have a traditional attorney-client relationship with the children. Id. There is much discussion
among child advocates about whether a child in dependency proceedings should be automatically
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multiple competing legal interests that the court must consider.
A. The Parent's Constitutional Right
In judicial proceedings involving children, the first and most funda-
mental interest is the parent's right. Parents have the right to raise their
children without the State's interference so long as they adequately care
for their children." The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that
this right is constitutionally protected.3 6 Justice Blackmun, writing for
the Supreme Court in Santosky v. Kramer, described this right as a "fun-
damental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and
management of their child . . . ."" This fundamental right applies to
both citizens and noncitizens equally," and only unfit parents can be
deprived of their right to the care and custody of their children."
Under current law, the State has the burden to prove that a parent is
not fit to have custody of his or her children by at least clear and con-
vincing evidence before a court may terminate a parent's rights.4 0 A par-
ent's right to the care and custody of his or her children is described as
"an important interest that 'undeniably warrants deference and, absent a
powerful countervailing interest, protection."' 4 ' Therefore, unless the
State meets its burden, proving that the parent is unfit by clear and con-
vincing evidence, a court may not terminate the legal parent-child rela-
appointed an attorney, a best interest advocate, or both. See, e.g., Jacob Ethan Smiles, A Child's
Due Process Right to Legal Counsel in Abuse and Neglect Dependency Proceedings, 37 FAM.
L.Q. 485 (2003). A recent study completed by First Star and Children's Advocacy Institute found
that sixty-one percent of states require the appointment of attorneys for abused or neglected
children, while more than thirty-nine percent of the states do not require appointment of an
attorney for children where abuse and neglect are alleged. CHILDREN'S ADVOCACY INST. & FIRST
STAR, A CHILD'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL 9 (3d ed. 2012). Of the states that require the appointment of
an attorney, only thirty-one percent mandate that the attorney have a traditional attomey-client
relationship with the child, including client-directed representation. Id. These statistics show that
although more than half of the states mandate the appointment of an attorney to children in
dependency proceedings, many states direct the attorney to represent the child's best interest
rather than the child's stated interest. Id.
35. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000).
36. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534-35 (1925); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
37. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.
38. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) ("The fourteenth amendment to the
constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens . . . . These provisions are universal in
their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences
of race, of color, or of nationality . . . ."); see also Nina Rabin, Disappearing Parents:
Immigration Enforcement and the Child Welfare System, 44 CONN. L. REV. 99, 143-45 (2011).
39. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.
40. Id. at 770.
41. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
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tionship.42 This is what is commonly referred to as the parental fitness
standard.4 3 The fitness standard benefits the parent because it prevents
the State from intruding on the parent's constitutional right to raise his
or her children.4 4 In addition, it benefits children because it recognizes
that children prefer to be with their parents, assuring children that "they
will always be connected-emotionally, socially, and through physical
custody-to their parents and that their relationship will not lightly be
destroyed."45
B. The State's Duty to Protect Children
The State, on the other hand, has an interest in the safety and wel-
fare of children as parens patriae.4 6 The Supreme Court acknowledged
in Prince v. Massachusetts that society's interest in protecting children
is a compelling state interest that may trump a parent's right to the care
and custody of his or her children.4 7 The Court recognized that where a
child's safety and wellbeing are at risk, the State has a duty to protect
that child, and if necessary, intrude on the parents' right to raise the
child by both retaining custody and directing the child's religious and
moral upbringing.4
The burden, however, is on the State. The State may remove chil-
dren from their homes and retain custody of them only after showing
that removing the children is necessary to protect them from imminent
danger.49 The Supreme Court has recognized that "while there is still
reason to believe that positive, nurturing parent-child relationships exist,
the State's interest as parens patriae favors preservation, not severance,
of natural familial bonds." 0 To permanently terminate the legal parent-
child relationship, the State must prove the statutory grounds for termi-
nation"' by clear and convincing evidence.52 The court will then issue an
42. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 770.
43. Yablon-Zug, supra note 24, at 71.
44. Zug, supra note 29, at 1156.
45. Id. at 1157 (quoting MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WrrH CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
25, 37 (2005)).
46. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 749 (1982).
50. Id. at 766-67.
51. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292 (2009) (grounds for termination include
abandonment, neglect, conduct that is found to be seriously detrimental to the well-being of the
child, permanent mental illness such that the parent is unable to care for the child, or abuse); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7B-l111(a) (2012) (grounds for termination include abuse, neglect, willful
abandonment, or the previous termination of the parent's rights of another child paired with lack
of the ability or willingness to establish a safe home).
52. Santozky, 445 U.S. at 770.
3292013]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
order of termination unless the record shows that it is not in the child's
best interest to terminate the parent's rights.53
The standard for terminating a parent's rights is much higher than
that for removal because the loss threatened in a termination proceeding
is "a significant deprivation of liberty."" Therefore, the intermediate
standard of proof, clear and convincing evidence, is necessary to "pre-
serve fundamental fairness."" Thus, while the State has a compelling
interest to protect children, the State's burden to show that the child is in
need of protection is heightened in proportion to the intrusion on the
parent's constitutionally protected interest.
Professor Zug also identifies the State's interest in educating citizen
children and keeping these children connected to the United States.56
Thomas Jefferson asserted that it is necessary to educate citizens to pre-
pare them to participate in the political system and to preserve the coun-
try's freedom and independence." While the Supreme Court has
recognized the importance of education as essential to the future of the
country," it has never held that a parent's right to the care and custody
of his or her children can be terminated in favor of a democratic educa-
tion and an American family. In cases where the parent's rights have
been subordinated, it is not the parent's custody that is at issue, but
rather the parent's right to direct the religious and moral upbringing of
his or her children.
For example, in Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, the
State's interest was held to trump the parents' rights because yielding to
the parents' rights concerning the direction of the child's education at a
public school would be detrimental to the State. 9 In Mozert, the Tennes-
see Board of Education adopted a reading curriculum that exposed stu-
dents to stories to which their parents objected on religious grounds.6 0
One mother objected to the reading curriculum because the stories pro-
moted "a religious tolerance that all religions are merely different roads
to God."6 ' The court recognized that children attending public schools
must be exposed to the "fundamental values 'essential to a democratic
society' . . . 'includ[ing] tolerance of divergent political and religious
53. In re B. & J., 756 N.W.2d 234, 239 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008).
54. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 756 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979)).
55. Id. at 756.
56. Zug, supra note 29, at 1147-52.
57. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
58. E.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (holding that school is
where children learn values essential for citizenship).
59. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
60. Id. at 1060.
61. Id. at 1068.
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views.'"62 In the court's estimation, the school's reading curriculum did
not create an unconstitutional burden under the Free Exercise Clause,
and the State's interest in educating its children outweighed the parents'
religious objections."
Conversely, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court held that the
State's interest in a child's education "is not totally free from a balanc-
ing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such
as . . . the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious
upbringing of their children."' In Yoder, Amish parents declined to
send their children to public or private school, thereby violating Wiscon-
sin's compulsory education law.6 5 The Court explained that in order for
the State to compel education, the State must show that there is a com-
pelling state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the parent's
right under the Free Exercise Clause.66 The Court recognized the State's
interest in formally educating its children in order to prepare its citizens
to participate intelligently in the political system and to create self-suffi-
cient citizens.6 This interest, however, was not so compelling that it
outweighed the Amish parents' right to raise their children in the Amish
religion, and the community was held to be exempt from the compulsory
education laws."
As the Supreme Court demonstrated in Yoder, the State's interest in
its citizen children may trump a parent's constitutional right, but only in
select circumstances. When compared to the parent's constitutional right
to the care and custody of his or her children, however, the State's inter-
est in keeping its citizen children connected to the United States and
educating them is not so substantial that it would trump the parent's
rights.
For the State to keep citizen children of deported fit parents in the
United States, the State would not merely be impinging on the parent's
right to the care and custody of his or her children, but would be termi-
nating it permanently. Before taking such extreme and permanent action,
the court must balance the private interests affected, the risk of error,
and the countervailing government interest.6 9 When balanced, the
State's interest does not outweigh the parent's constitutional right to the
care and custody of his or her children.
62. Id. (quoting Bethel, 478 U.S. at 681).
63. Id. at 1070.
64. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972).
65. Id. at 208.
66. Id. at 214.
67. Id. at 221.
68. Id. at 222.
69. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982).
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C. The Child's Two-Fold Interest
Children have an interest that must be represented on equal footing
with that of the parents and the State. The child's interest in dependency
and termination proceedings has been evaluated using two distinct, but
commonly confused, standards of representation: the child's best inter-
est and the child's interest.70 The child's interest refers to the child's
express wishes, whereas the child's best interest refers to a determina-
tion made by a court appointed advocate that is then presented to the
court." While the child's interest and the child's best interest materialize
as adverse positions in many instances, the two interests are, in actuality,
different manifestations of the child's rights, both statutory and constitu-
tional. In a proceeding that determines what will happen to a child, the
child's rights cannot be ignored.72
1. THE CHILD'S CONSTITUTIONAL INTEREST IN PRESERVING
FAMILIAL RELATIONSHIPS
Children, like their parents, have a constitutional interest in pre-
serving their parent-child relationship.7 3 An erroneous termination of the
child's relationship with his or her parents deprives the child of "the
right of support and maintenance, for which he may thereafter be depen-
dent on society; the right to inherit; and all other rights inherent in the
legal parent-child relationship, not just for [a limited period], but for-
ever."74 In light of the permanent and far-reaching effect of termination,
the parent and the child share an interest in preserving their relationship
until and unless the state has proven the parent unfit.
Justice Stevens has characterized the child's interest in preserving
the parent-child relationship as a liberty interest protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment.76 In his dissenting opinion in Troxel v. Granville, he
urged the court to consider the child's rights instead of treating the child
70. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND
NEGLECT CASES A-i cmt. (2003).
71. About Us, COURT APPOINTED SPECIAL ADVOCATES, http://www.casaforchildren.org/site/c
.mtJSJ7MPIsE/b.5301303/k.6FBl/AboutUsCASAforChildren.htm (last visited Jan. 15,
2013).
72. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND
NEGLECT CASES A-I introductory cmt. (2003) (The American Bar Association's Standards of
Practice for Lawyers Representing Children in Custody Cases indicates that one of its purposes is
to keep the child's best interest "in the center of the courts' attention" and to "promote the best
interests of children.").
73. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760 ("But until the State proves parental unfitness, the child and his
parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship.").
74. In re K.S., 515 P.2d 130, 133 (Colo. App. 1973).
75. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760.
76. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 87-89 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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as property in a dispute between the State and the parents." He
explained that even though the Court had not opined on the child's lib-
erty interests, to him it was apparent that since parents and families have
fundamental liberty interests in preserving familial relationships, chil-
dren naturally have these same interests, which must be considered in
the balancing equation alongside the parents' and the State's interests.
2. THE CHILD'S STATUTORY RIGHT TO PERMANENCY
The child's rights are not only constitutional in origin but also stat-
utory. In 1997, Congress enacted the Adoption and Safe Families Act of
1997 ("ASFA")79 to encourage states to achieve permanency for the
children in their care, recognizing children's right to a permanent
home. 0 As the predecessor to the ASFA, the Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Act of 1980 ("AACWA")8' articulated the policy goal of
family preservation by mandating reasonable efforts aimed at keeping
families together.8 2 This policy, however, did not lend itself to establish-
ing permanency for children in foster care and resulted in larger foster
care caseloads in the 1980s.1' Congress soon recognized the benefits of
permanency and sought to decrease the number of children perpetually
in state custody through the enactment of the ASFA.
The ASFA shifted the focus of the AACWA by amending the latter
statute in several important ways.84 First, where the AACWA required
child welfare agencies to make reasonable efforts to keep families
together, the ASFA limits the circumstances under which states must
attempt to keep families together and encourages expedited termination
of parental rights proceedings." Second, unlike the AACWA, the ASFA
requires permanency hearings within the first twelve months of a child's
placement in foster care to determine if the child may be "'freed' for
adoption."8 6 Moreover, the ASFA requires that states initiate termination
proceedings against the parent after the child has spent fifteen of the
most recent twenty-two months in foster care.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 88-89.
79. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 11 Stat. 2115 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 673b, 678, 679b (2012)).
80. Libby S. Adler, The Meanings of Permanence: A Critical Analysis of the Adoption and
Safe Families Act of 1997, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 1, 1 (2001).
81. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 3.
84. Id.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (2012); Adler, supra note 80, at 3.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5) (2012); Adler, supra note 80, at 3.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5); C. Elizabeth Hall, Note, Where Are My Children ... And My Rights?
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The ASFA shifted the focus of child welfare from the rights of the
parents to the rights of the children. The AACWA recognized the bene-
fits of keeping families together and statutorily forced states to enact
legislation to support reunification efforts." While noble in its efforts,
the AACWA induced states to pass legislation that effectively deprived
children of their right to permanency.89 The ASFA, in contrast, recog-
nized that the goal for some families should be reunification, but that
this could not be the goal for every child without depriving some chil-
dren of their right to a permanent and stable home.
III. STRIKING A BALANCE
Terminating a parent's rights is the most extreme and permanent
result in child welfare cases. Termination denies the parent physical cus-
tody, interferes with the right to communicate and visit with the child,
and prevents the parent from ever regaining custody of the child.90
Moreover, the child is negatively affected by an erroneous termination.
Children permanently lose the right to their parent-child relationship and
all that this relationship entails: support, maintenance, inheritance, and
companionship. 91 To interrupt this natural relationship, the State must
balance all of the interests involved and determine that the parent is not
fit to care for and thus retain custody of his or her children.92
The fitness standard strikes a fair balance, ensuring the child's
safety while protecting both the parent and the child from an erroneous
termination. The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]here is a presumption
that fit parents act in their children's best interests."93 Where a parent is
fit and there is no finding of abuse, abandonment, or neglect, a child's
best interest is not in dispute. Alternatively, where there have been find-
ings of abuse, abandonment, or neglect, but the State has not proven the
grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence, there are less
restrictive means to protect the child than permanently ending the legal
parent-child relationship.9 4
After a child is initially removed from his or her home and adjudi-
Parental Rights Termination as a Consequence of Deportation, 60 DuKE L.J. 1459, 1467-68
(2011).
88. Adler, supra note 80, at 3.
89. The state legislation encouraging family reunification caused children from troubled
families to spend more time in foster care as the agencies made futile attempts to preserve the
family relationships. Id.
90. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 749 (1982).
91. In re K.S., 515 P.2d 130, 133 (Colo. App. 1973).
92. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760.
93. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 58 (2000).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5) (2012) (During periodic case review, the court identifies the least
restrictive placement that is appropriate for the child's best interest and special needs. The court
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cated dependent, the State must provide the child's parents with a case
plan that delineates services required of the parents as well as the child
while the child is in foster care.95 The goal of a case plan is to facilitate
the return of the child to his or her own home once it is safe to do so and
the parents' issues have been resolved.9 6 In cases where the parent has
not completed or is unable to complete the required services enumerated
in the case plan, termination of that parent's rights is allowable only
after the parent has been proven to be unfit by clear and convincing
evidence.97 When the burden to terminate the parent's rights cannot be
met, there are other permanency options available.98
For example, the court has the discretion to extend the parent's case
plan in extraordinary circumstances, allowing the parent more time to
complete it and thus reunify the family. Alternatively, there are other
permanency options where reunification may not be in the child's best
interest.99 Permanency options that do not include terminating the par-
ent's rights provide the child with the stability of a permanent place-
ment, while preserving the parent-child relationship. Such options
preserve not only the parent's right to communicate, visit, and possibly
petition for custody of his or her child, but also the child's rights that are
tied to the parent-child relationship, such as inheritance, support, mainte-
nance, and companionship.
A. Defining the Best Interest of the Child
Where suspicions of abuse or neglect exist, the child may be taken
into state custody if a court determines that this is in the child's best
interest. "0 However, as discussed above, the standard for termination is
much higher than that for a temporary removal."o' A best interest stan-
dard provides little to no guidance to courts in deciding when to termi-
nate a parent's parental rights, especially given that courts must still
address the parent's constitutional considerations.' 02 In the 1970s, Pro-
fessor Michael S. Wald opined that a best interest standard for termina-
tion would result in decisions reflecting a judge's own "folk
psychology," promoting discretionary, and even discriminatory,
determines the permanency plan for the child, whether it be reunification, termination of parental
rights, legal guardianship, or another planned permanent living arrangement.).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 675(l)(B).
96. Id.
97. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 675(l)(E) (The child could be placed with a relative, a legal guardian, or in
another planned permanent living arrangement.).
100. Zug, supra note 29, at 68.
101. See supra Pan H.A.
102. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010).
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removal.' In termination proceedings, however, the child's best inter-
est is considered only after the court has determined that the parent is
unfit, thereby eliminating the possibility of discretionary removal.104
Any use of the best interest standard raises issues of subjectivity.
Every individual comes from a unique set of circumstances, bringing
with him his own preferences, cultural norms, and customs. Ultimately,
it would be impossible to completely remove the decision maker's "folk
psychology" from a best interest determination."o' To minimize the
effect of the decision maker's personal bias in deciding what is in a
child's best interest, many states' statutes delineate specific factors for
courts to consider in making these determinations.106 Those states that
do not list factors give general goals and guidance, leaving the decision
to the court's discretion. '
As murky as the best interest waters may be, the courts have con-
sistently declared that a determination of a child's best interest is not a
comparative one. In 1898, the Supreme Court of Nebraska declared that
"[t]he court has never deprived a parent of the custody of a child merely
because, on financial or other grounds, a stranger might better pro-
vide." 0 8 More recently, in termination cases against deported parents,
courts have held that a parent cannot be deprived of their parental rights
solely because the State believes the child will have a better life in the
United States as opposed to another country.109
For example, in In re Interest of Angelica L., Maria Luis' parental
rights as to her two children, Daniel and Angelica, were terminated after
the juvenile court concluded that it was in the children's best interest not
103. Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards of
Removal of Children From Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and
Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REv. 623, 649-50 (1976).
104. E.g., In re B. & J., 756 N.W.2d 234, 239 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (explaining that once a
parent is found to be unfit, the court will enter an order terminating parental rights unless it is clear
that termination is not in the child's best interest); In re Interest of Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d 74,
91-92 (Neb. 2009) (explaining that the state must prove that one of more of the statutory grounds
for termination has been met by clear and convincing evidence and that termination is in the
child's best interest); In re Interest of Xavier H., 740 N.W.2d 13, 25 (Neb. 2007) (explaining that
the court may evaluate whether termination is in the best interest of the child only after the parent
is found to be unfit).
105. Professor Wald argues that a test requiring judges and child welfare officials to weigh the
likely impact of living at home or in foster care requires calculations that are extremely difficult
regardless of how carefully they are defined. Wald, supra note 103, at 650.
106. CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, DETERMINING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD: SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS, (2010) available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/
laws-policies/statutes/bestinterest.cfm#5.
107. Id.
108. Norval v. Zinsmaster, 77 N.W. 373, 374 (Neb. 1898).
109. E.g., In re Interest of Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d 74, 94 (Neb. 2009); In re B & J, 756
N.W.2d 234, 241 (Mich. 2008); In re Xavier H., 740 N.W.2d 13, 26 (Neb. 2007).
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to return with her to Guatemala.o"0 Angelica was born two months pre-
mature and experienced health problems as an infant."' Maria, recog-
nizing that she needed help, sought assistance from Healthy Starts, a
program that educates parents on the growth and development of
infants.112 Maria again took Angelica to the hospital when Angelica was
having trouble breathing." 3 The doctor treated Angelica and instructed
Maria to bring her back in two days, but believing that Angelica was
recovering, Maria did not return.1 4 When the Department of Health and
Human Services ("DHHS") arrived at Maria's house, Maria panicked
and misidentified herself as the babysitter."5 Consequently, Maria was
arrested for obstructing a government operation and her children were
placed in protective custody."' 6
Not long after her arrest, Maria was taken into custody by immigra-
tion authorities and deported to Guatemala."' Though the distance made
everything more complicated, Maria did not stop fighting for her chil-
dren and attempted to complete her case plan in Guatemala."' When
Maria sought help in locating the requisite parenting classes and coun-
seling, the caseworker told her that Maria would have to "take the initia-
tive" herself in finding and arranging those services.119
After the children had been in foster care for more than fifteen
months and Maria had not strictly complied with her case plan, the State
filed a petition to terminate her parental rights. 20 During the trial, a
clinical psychologist testified that the children would experience culture
shock if they were sent to Guatemala.' 2 ' The psychologist also testified
that the standard of living is lower in Guatemala than in the United
States.' 2 2 He did not, however, testify that he had concerns for the chil-
dren's safety in Maria's care.' 23 In addition, two home studies concluded
that Maria's home in Guatemala was suitable for the children, and that it
110. In re Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 87.
111. Maria first took Angelica to the hospital when she was one-month old and was "suffering
from dehydration, malnutrition, a urinary tract infection, and a left pulmonary branch stenosis."
Id. at 81.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 82.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 83.
119. Id. at 84.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 85.
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was in the children's best interest to return with her. 124 The juvenile
court, however, found that Maria was unfit because she "either A)
embarked on an unauthorized trip to the United States with a newborn or
premature infant or B) gave birth to a premature infant in the United
States" and "did not provide the basic level of postnatal care . ...
The Nebraska Supreme Court overturned Maria's termination and
sent the children with her to Guatemala. The Court found that Maria's
attempt to bring her children to the United States did not constitute a
lack of care for her children and that none of the State's evidence estab-
lished that Maria was unfit.12 6 Furthermore, the Court noted that the
State's belief that growing up in Guatemala would put the children at a
disadvantage as compared to growing up in the United States was insuf-
ficient to show that it was in the best interest of Daniel and Angelica to
remain with their foster parents. 12 1 Specifically, the Court declared that
"the 'best interests' of the child standard does not require simply that a
determination be made that one environment or set of circumstances is
superior to another."l 28
Nebraska is not alone in its assertion. In In re B. & J., a Michigan
appellate court noted that a subjective belief that the children would
have a more prosperous life in the United States in comparison to Guate-
mala was not evidence that it was in the children's best interest to termi-
nate the parent's parental rights.12 9 A Maryland appellate court has also
recognized that the best interest standard is not simply a determination
that one environment is superior to another.'3 0
B. The Bounds of the Child's Rights
Frequently, a child's voice gets lost and the court instead relies on a
child's best interest determination. Children, regardless of age, have
ideas, thoughts, and opinions that should be considered in any proceed-
ing affecting them.'"' By the same token, just because a child is
involved does not mean that the child's desires will determine the out-
come. For example, in cases where the child is in need of protection, the
child's desire to stay with an abusive or neglectful parent is outweighed
by the State's duty to protect the child. The State plays a vital role in
124. Id. at 87.
125. Id. at 88.
126. Id. at 93.
127. Id. at 93-94.
128. Id. at 94.
129. In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d 234, 241 (Mich. 2008).
130. In re Yve S., 819 A.2d 1030, 1038 (Md. 2003).
131. MODEL ACT GOVERNING THE REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND
DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS 11 (2011).
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protecting children from harm, and the State occasionally must act in
ways that are contrary to the child's wishes. 132 In such instances, even
though the State is acting against the child's expressed wishes, it is
asserting the child's right to protection. 13 3
Similarly, where a parent is fit, the State will not impinge on a
parent's right to make decisions about where his or her children live.13 4
The child's wishes are not always aligned with those of the parent. Par-
ents are charged with the duty to protect their children's rights and inter-
ests.13 1 Children have a constitutional interest in preserving their
relationship with their parents and the right to live in a home free from
abuse and neglect."' Absent a finding of parental unfitness, the parents
serve the child's interest in preserving the parent-child relationship by
making decisions about where the family will live.137 A fit parent's
choice regarding where to live does not impinge on the child's rights,
even where the parent's choice is contrary to the child's wish.
Children's rights are not dependent on the citizenship of their par-
ents. A United States citizen child of a noncitizen parent has the same
rights as a child of a citizen parent. When involving a parent's decision
to cross a border, "a child's voice cannot be amplified beyond the con-
sideration it would warrant in other instances where children disagree
with parental decisions about where to live."138 Thus, absent a finding of
parental unfitness, the child's parent has equal authority to make deci-
sions about both domestic moves and international moves without State
imposition.13 9
After balancing the child's rights, the parents' rights, and the
State's duty to protect its children, it is clear that applying a best interest
standard in termination proceedings where deportation is probable will
encroach on both the parent's and the child's constitutionally protected
interest in preserving their relationship with each other. The deportation
status of the parent is irrelevant in termination proceedings. Where there
is no finding of unfitness, it is in the child's best interest and constitu-
tional interest to reunite with his or her parent. The child's best interest
analysis is not comparative, and the child's voice cannot be given more
weight solely because the parent is moving the child across a border.
132. David B. Thronson, Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the Parent-Child Relationship,
6 NEV. L.J. 1165, 1206 (2006).
133. Id. at 1179.
134. Id. at 1178.
135. Id. at 1179.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1206.
139. Id.
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Alternatively, using the fitness standard in termination proceedings
regardless of the alien or deportation status of the parents protects the
child from harm, while ensuring that the parent and child are not errone-
ously deprived of their relationship. 140
IV. Is HISTORY REPEATING ITSELF?
This is not the first time that American society has accepted the
idea that children are better off with traditional American families. This
country's history is littered with prejudices against parents based on
their ethnicity, religion, language, class, and marital status.' 4 ' The child
welfare system provides meaningful protection for children subjected to
abuse and neglect, but at the same time it has frequently confused abuse
and neglect with poverty and culture. 142 Looking through the history of
child welfare, the American standard of good parents is clear: "married;
White; Christian (preferably Protestant); Anglo, and relatedly, English-
speaking; and middle class."' 4 3 The child welfare system ignores the
reality that all parents do not fit into the mold that the system has cre-
ated. A good parent may look, sound, and act differently than the "ideal"
parent in the nuclear family that has become the only acceptable model.
When families are separated, parents lose the opportunity to pass down
their language, culture, and values-and children lose their heritage.'"
Two major child welfare movements in history sought to "Americanize"
children of culturally different families: European immigrants in the
nineteenth century and Native Americans.
A. The Orphan Train Movement
In the nineteenth century, between 150,000 and 200,000 children
were put on trains in the Eastern United States and relocated to live in
the Western United States with farm families.145 These trains came to be
known as "orphan trains."146 Despite the movement's name, many of
these children were not orphans at all. In the early 1800s, cities began to
expand and a significant number of poor and neglected children suffered
140. The Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment applies equally to United
States citizens and aliens. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). Using a different
standard for termination of parental rights depending on the parent's deportation status violates the
Fourteenth Amendment because it is an impermissible bait and switch, using "deportation status"
as a proxy for "alien status."
141. Annette R. Appell, "Bad" Mothers and Spanish-Speaking Caregivers, 7 NEV. L.J. 759,
759 (2007).
142. Id. at 760.
143. Id. at 765.
144. Id. at 760.
145. Rebecca S. Trammell, Orphan Train Myths and Legal Reality, 5 MOD. AM. at 3, 4 (2009).
146. Id.
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terrible conditions, living in almshouses alongside disabled and poor
adults. 14 7 Public services did not adequately address the children's
needs, so private organizations began to intervene and implement pro-
grams to protect children and prepare them for adulthood.148 These
groups were known as the "child savers."14 9 The child savers sought to
better the living conditions of the children, providing basic education
and placing children into apprenticeships or indentured servitude. 5 o
The mid-1800s were also marked by an economic recession and
jobs became scarce.15 ' A growing number of children were living on the
city streets, and, as a result, more private charities were formed to meet
the increasing demand for children's services. 152 Due to the lack of
employment opportunities in the East, the charities began placing the
children in rural areas where the labor was needed.' States in the East
enacted legislation that allowed the private charities to place children out
of state with no geographic restrictions. 15 The children were placed on
trains in mass numbers and sent to the West to work on farms as inden-
tured servants. '55
The majority of the children "saved" were not orphans, but were
children of Catholic immigrant working class and poor families, often
headed by single mothers.156 The disproportionate number of immigrant
children being removed from their homes was not a coincidence. The
cultural atmosphere of the time emphasized the importance of immigrant
children being raised in "good" American, Protestant homes.' 5 7 The
child savers sought to reform children by "removing them from their
families of origin so they could be socialized into appropriate citi-
zens."158 Furthermore, the strategy of the Children's Aid Society
included deliberately separating immigrant Catholic children from their
families.159 Child savers took children from their homes because the
child savers viewed the parents as "vile."' 60 These children were put on
trains headed West and would stand humiliated and terrified on plat-
147. Appell, supra note 141, at 763.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Trammell, supra note 145, at 3.
151. Id. at 3-4.
152. Id. at 4.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Appell, supra note 141, at 763.
157. Naomi Cahn, Race, Poverty, History, Adoption, and Child Abuse: Connections, 36 LAW
& Soc'y REv. 461, 466 (2002).
158. Id. at 467.
159. Id. at 464.
160. Id.
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forms as new families inspected them as if they were cattle. 16 1 Some
children were lucky enough to land in homes with loving families. 1 6 2
Others were not so lucky. Some disappeared en route,163 while many
were left with families who abused them and exploited them for their
labor.' 64
This movement began as a sincere attempt to save destitute,
orphaned children and send them to appropriate homes where they
would grow up to be "American." Defenders of the movement point to
the fact that "at the time, thousands of ragged children swarmed New
York City streets, subsisting as scavengers, prostitutes, beggars, ped-
dlers, [and] thieves."1 65 In reality, families were judged and torn apart as
a result of their religion and culture. Society sincerely believed that the
children would be better off in American homes as opposed to living
with their poor, immigrant families. In retrospect, the entire enterprise is
"viewed with a jaundiced eye,"1 66 and the child savers are "regarded as
'cruelly indifferent to the very children [they] had been designed to
help.' "167
Terminating parental rights because a parent is or will be deported
because a modern-day court has determined that it is in the child's best
interest to stay in the United States will produce a result similar to that
of the Orphan Train Movement: non-traditional and diverse families-
those that diverge from the model that society has established as "nor-
mal"-will be torn apart because of the belief that children are better off
in a different environment than the one the parent would provide.
B. "Civilizing" Native Americans
A similar cultural bias has nearly destroyed the Native American
tribes in the United States. It has been said that "children are the most
'logical targets of a policy designed to erase one culture and replace it
with another' since they are the most 'vulnerable to change and least
able to resist it.'" 6 8 This is exactly what colonial settlers attempted to
161. LeRoy Ashby, History Through Tears, 57 OR. ST. B. BULL. 70 (1997). See also
Trammell, supra note 145, at 5 (describing a newspaper report telling the readers that the children
were being shipped all over the country, "given away and sold like cattle").
162. Kurt Mundorff, Children As Chatel: Invoking the Thirteenth Amendment to Reform Child
Welfare, 1 CARDOZO PUB. L. PoL'Y & ETHICS J. 131, 176 (2003).
163. Ashby, supra note 161.
164. Id.
165. NINA BERNSTEIN, THE LOST CHILDREN OF Wilder: The Epic Struggle to Change Foster
Care 199 (1st ed. 2001).
166. Id.
167. Yablon-Zug, supra note 24, at 107 (quoting STEPHEN O'CONNOR, ORPHAN TRAINS: THE
STORY OF CHARLES LORING BRACE AND THE CHILDREN HE SAVED AND FAILED XiX (2001)).
168. Lorie M. Graham, "The Past Never Vanishes": A Contextual Critique of the Existing
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do beginning as early as the 1600s. 169
1. EARLY EFFORTS AT ASSIMILATION
During the 1600s, missionaries, with the intention of educating the
Native American children, removed these children from their commu-
nity and assimilated them into mainstream society. 170 This exercise con-
tinued into the mid-1700s when missionaries established boarding
schools for Native American children."' The children were taught in a
"Christian manner," effectively stripping them of their heritage and cul-
ture, while converting them into English adults.172 The missionaries
were relatively unsuccessful in converting the children, but their desire
to civilize the "savages" set the stage for similarly inspired federal
policies.1 73
In the 1800s, "humanitarian reformers" also aimed to assimilate the
Native Americans into mainstream society.' 74 Despite the federal gov-
ernment's political relationship with the Native Americans, the individ-
ual states voiced their hostility towards tribal sovereignty.'7 5 In
response, Congress passed the Indian Civilization Fund Act, which
funded programs to provide moral education for Native American chil-
dren, thereby stripping them of their culture.6'7 This was just the begin-
ning of a number of federal policies aimed at "civilizing" the Native
Americans. The programs removed the children from their homes and
tribes and placed them in boarding schools.'7 7 When temporary removal
failed to replace the cultural identities of the children, more extreme
measures were utilized."17 Federal boarding schools added a provision
that required the Native American students to "spend a period of one or
more years of their school life away from the school in selected white
families, under the supervision of the school .. . thus gaining experience
in practical self-support and induction into civilized family life other-
wise unattainable."17 9
In the 1950s, Congress adopted a policy that sought to assimilate
Indian Family Doctrine, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 1, 10 (1998) (quoting CLYDE ELLIS, To CHANGE
THEM FOREVER 3 (1996)).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 12.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 13.
174. Id. at 13-14.
175. Id. at 14.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 16.
178. Id. at 18.
179. Id. (quoting COMM'R OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT 430 (1900)).
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the Native American children by permanently removing them from their
tribes and families and terminating their parents' rights.1 80 The previ-
ously constitutionally protected relationship between the federal govern-
ment and the Native American tribes was fading, and Congress passed a
string of laws that sought to eliminate tribal sovereignty altogether.18 1
State governments were given jurisdiction over tribes and their mem-
bers, allowing state welfare agencies to manage "matters basic to
[Native American] cultural integrity such as education, adoption, and
land use."l 8 2 Education became the focus again, and the newly instituted
programs were devoid of any instruction on Native American tribal cul-
ture.183 These efforts at assimilation, however, not only failed, but left
Native American children with deep-seated feelings of inferiority and
self-consciousness because of their heritage.184
In addition to controlling education, the state agencies also con-
trolled Native American child welfare cases during this time.' 8 As out-
siders, the state officials were unable and unwilling to address the
cultural interests of the families they sought to help.186 The cultural gap
between the tribes and the welfare officials resulted in policies aimed at
removing the children from their families and placing them in non-
Native American homes where it was believed that they would be better
off.' The Native American parents and tribes, however, continued to
fight for their children and their culture throughout the assimilation
efforts.'18 Despite the parents' and tribes' attempts, one-third of Native
American children were separated from their families and their tribes
and placed in non-Native American foster homes, adoptive homes, and
educational institutions before Congress passed the Indian Child Welfare
Act ("ICWA") in 1978. 189
Ignorance of the Native American cultural and social norms of
child rearing triggered the states' decisions to remove many of the chil-
dren from their homes and communities.190 In particular, child welfare
officials had no conception of the Native American family dynamics,
working under the belief that members of the nuclear family are the only
180. Id. at 20.
18 1. Id.
182. Id. at 20-21 (quoting FELIX S. COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 58
(Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982)).
183. Id. at 21.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 22.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 16-17, 22.
189. Id. at 2.
190. Id. at 25.
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acceptable individuals to assume parenting positions.' 9 ' Tribal culture,
however, recognized, and continues to recognize, that the extended fam-
ily assumes the same child rearing responsibilities as the parent, while
non-tribal society interpreted this shared parenting system as evidence of
neglect.19 2 This culture clash and "my-way-or-the-highway" approach
adopted by child welfare agencies and juvenile courts led to the termina-
tion of Native American parents' rights in many cases.
Additionally, societal notions of poverty led child welfare officials
to remove children from homes that were perfectly suitable by Native
American standards.19 3 The American middle class typically judges
what constitutes a suitable home for a child based on the home's mate-
rial attributes, which have far less value in the Native American cul-
ture.194 Consequently, the rights of Native American parents were
terminated on the grounds that pre-adoptive families were in a superior
financial position. By child welfare standards, superior financial ability
meant that the pre-adoptive families were able to provide a better home
and way of life than the child's own parents could provide.' 95 Further-
more, because the child's best interest standard was utilized in termina-
tion proceedings involving Native American parents, the burden was on
the parents to show that they were fit to raise their children in accor-
dance with American society's middle class standards.' 96
2. THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1978
Congress enacted the ICWA'9 7 in 1978 to protect the Native Amer-
ican children, their families, and their tribes. The ICWA was designed to
prevent further abuses by child welfare agencies and to remedy the
severe damage that had been done to the Native American tribes, fami-
lies, and culture.' The ICWA was "an official acknowledgement by the
federal government that [Native American] children are not necessarily
'better off' far from the influence of family and community[, and] recog-
nize[d] that [a Native American] child's best interests may be inextrica-
bly connected to that of the tribe."' 99
Prior to the enactment of the ICWA, child welfare officials
removed children from their homes and terminated their parents' rights
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 27.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 28.
197. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2012)).
198. Graham, supra note 168, at 32.
199. Id. at 34.
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based on the officials' cultural biases and preconceived notions that
Native American children would be better off in non-Native American
homes.2 00 It has been more than thirty years since Congress, through
legislation, recognized that a child's best interest cannot be based on
financial comparatives and societal norms about culture and education.
Still, child welfare officials and judges today are using the same narrow-
minded notion of what constitutes a "good" home and a "good" parent in
order to terminate parents' rights. Immigrant parents, like Native Ameri-
can parents, are not necessarily unfit because they are poorer than most
Americans, live in a culturally distinct community, and have different
values regarding how to raise their own children.
The ICWA offers a model for child welfare reform to follow. It
does not allow Native American parents to subject their children to
abuse or harm, nor does it exempt the parents from State oversight
where state interference is warranted. The ICWA, however, establishes
minimum standards and procedural safeguards for the removal of Native
American children from their homes.201 This same approach should be
utilized in the context of deported and deportable immigrant parents.
The children of immigrants have the right to grow up free from abuse
and neglect, and child welfare agencies and officials must continue to
act in a manner consistent with this right, balancing the parent's right to
the care and custody of his or her child with the State's duty to protect
its children. Immigrant parents, in turn, should receive the same recogni-
tion and protections that the ICWA affords Native American parents.
The idea that children are better off living with White or American fami-
lies was rejected by Congress more than thirty years ago. Allowing a
court to terminate a deported or deportable parent's rights under the
child's best interest standard instead of the fitness standard would invite
child welfare officials, consciously or not, to make the termination deci-
sion based on the idea that the child would be "better off' growing up in
the United States as compared to the parent's home country.
V. So THERE'S A PROBLEM; How Do WE Fix IT?
As evidenced by the numerous juvenile court decisions terminating
a parent's rights based on the parent's deportation status, there is clearly
a disconnect between the law and practice.202 One way to solve this
problem would be to change the law. At the outset, this Comment
presented Professor Marcia Zug's argument that, rather than continue to
200. Id. at 32.
201. Id. at 33.
202. See, e.g., In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d 825 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); In re B. & J., 756 N.W.2d 234
(Mich. Ct. App. 2008); In re Interest of Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d 74 (Neb. 2009).
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apply the parental fitness standard, the law should be changed to reflect
the child's best interest. 20 3 This Comment has demonstrated that the fit-
ness standard adequately addresses every party's interests, and that using
the best interest of the child standard for situations where the parent will
likely be deported is a constitutionally inadequate solution, and a histori-
cally censured approach toward cultures unlike that of mainstream
America. However, the problematic intersect between child welfare law
and immigration law must be addressed.2 " Several scholars have sug-
gested different ways to remedy this tension.
One suggestion involves amending the Adoption and Safe Families
Act of 1997 ("ASFA") to resolve the tensions between immigration law
and child welfare law. 205 The ASFA requires that states initiate termina-
tion proceedings against the parent after the child has spent twelve con-
secutive months or fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months in
foster care. 206 There are three narrow exceptions to this requirement, and
if the child does not qualify for one of them, the State will be required to
prove that the parent is unfit by clear and convincing evidence in order
to terminate the parent's rights.207 The ASFA, however, requires only
that termination proceedings be commenced and does not indicate that
the mere fact that a child has been in foster care for fifteen months is
grounds to terminate the parent's rights.208
There are two major issues with the ASFA that, if addressed, could
begin to remedy the tensions between immigration law and child welfare
law. First, the ASFA does not address situations of detained or deported
parents of United States citizen children. Parents of citizen children who
are involved in deportation proceedings may be forced to leave their
children in foster care. Depending on how long the deportation proceed-
ings take, the incarceration may trigger termination proceedings under
the ASFA's fifteen-month requirement. The fifteen-month trigger for
termination proceedings poses a serious problem for undocumented
immigrant parents who have been deported or are currently the subject
of deportation proceedings.209
Oftentimes, children of undocumented immigrant parents land in
foster care as a result of the parents' incarceration during deportation
203. Zug, supra note 29, at 1143.
204. See Angela D. Morrison & David Thronson, Beyond Status: Seeing the Whole Child, 33
EVALUATION & PROGRAM PLAN 281, 281 (2010) ("Immigration law often operates in ways that
intentionally hinder family unity, which in the child welfare context enjoys tremendous
constitutional protection.").
205. Hall, supra note 87, at 1467-68.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1470.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1494.
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proceedings and the parents' subsequent deportation. 2 10 These parents
do not have the resources to defend themselves in termination proceed-
ings, especially if the proceedings occur after they have been
deported.2 11 Caseworkers frequently deny help to these parents while
they are incarcerated and after they have been deported by blocking
access both to their children and to resources that could assist them in
completing their case plan.212 The ASFA's requirement that the State
commence termination proceedings after fifteen of twenty-two months
in foster care often results in detained and deported parents facing the
possibility of losing their children forever with no access to assistance or
resources that could help them defend themselves.2 13
The second way in which the ASFA adversely affects detained or
deported parents is that when the expedited permanency process inter-
sects with immigration law, the lack of integration of these disparate
laws and policies leaves immigrant families at a severe disadvantage.214
During deportation proceedings, federal immigration law does not allow
courts to consider family ties or the fact that the undocumented immi-
grant has citizen children.215 As a result, the parent's dependency or ter-
mination hearing could occur while the parent awaits his or her
deportation hearing.216 This intersection of criminal law, child welfare
law, and immigration law and policy is not addressed, and this critical
oversight results in severe consequences for immigrant families.
Additionally, communication is essential to child welfare prac-
tices.217 Oftentimes, detained or deported parents are not provided
access to interpreters or services tailored to their cultural needs and
expectations.21 8 This can cause faulty parental and family assessments,
which in turn result in erroneous or premature termination. 21 9 The lack
of culturally appropriate services further disadvantages parents when
there could be placement with a relative rather than foster care place-
22ment.220 Information is often lost in translation when dealing with par-
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See Zug, supra note 29, at 93 ("It is not uncommon for state child welfare agencies to
withhold assistance, tell lies, and even contact immigration authorities if they believe such actions
will ensure the termination of an immigrant parent's rights.").
213. Hall, supra note 87, at 1495.
214. Yali Lincroft & Bill Bettencourt, The Impact ofASFA on Immigrant Children in the Child
Welfare System, 29 CHILD L. PRAC. 21, 24 (April 2010).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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ents who are not proficient in English.22 1 Furthermore, social workers
are not familiar with the process of placing children in a relative's care
outside the United States because there are no guidelines for this kind of
placement. 2 2 2 Remedying the linguistic and cross-cultural divide would
begin the process of preventing erroneous terminations of deported yet
fit parents.
In her student note, Where Are My Children ... And My Rights?
Parental Rights Termination as a Consequence of Deportation, C. Eliza-
beth Hall recognizes that the constitutional procedural safeguards that
were designed to prevent wrongful termination of a parent's rights are
failing in cases involving detained and deported parents.223 She argues
that one way to begin remedying the issue would be to amend the ASFA
to account for the problems that detained and deported parents of citizen
children face.224 In 2009, such amendments were proposed in Congress
as part of the Humane Enforcement and Legal Protections Separated
Children Act ("HELP Separated Children Act"). 2 25 The amendments
would have created protocols for situations involving a detained or
deported parent of United States citizen children.226 If adopted, the Act
would have required states to create guidelines to address both the
child's best interest and the best outcome for the family. 227 Furthermore,
deported or detained parents would be appointed a case manager or
interpreter who speaks the parent's native language.228 These protocols
would demonstrate a respect for the immigrant parents' rights and pre-
vent termination resulting solely from a parent's deportation.229 Adop-
tion of this Act, or one with similar protections for deported parents,
would have prevented wrongful termination of a fit parent's parental
rights and ensured that the child achieved permanency. Hall, however,
suggests several changes that should be included in a reintroduced ver-
sion of the Act.230 These changes include a provision for a presumption
that, absent a showing of parental unfitness, reunification is in the best
interest of the both child and the family, as well as a specification that
the best interest inquiries take place only after the fitness inquiry, consis-
tent with current constitutional law.231 In addition, Hall proposes that the
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Hall, supra note 87, at 1493.
224. Id. at 1493-94.
225. Id. at 1495; HELP Separated Children Act, H.R. 3531, 111th Cong. (2009).
226. Hall, supra note 87, at 1495; H.R. 3531 § 6(a)(3)(A).
227. Hall, supra note 87, at 1495; H.R. 3531 § 6(a)(3)(B), (E).
228. Hall, supra note 87, at 1495; H.R. 3531 § 6(a)(3)(D), (F).
229. Hall, supra note 87, at 1495.
230. Id. at 1496.
231. Id.
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reintroduced Act indicate that the fifteen-month requirement does not
apply to separated children, i.e. children legally in the United States liv-
ing in foster care with a parent who has been detained by immigration
authorities for deportation.23 2
Hall also suggests that adherence to the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations ("Vienna Convention") would aid in preventing erro-
neous terminations.2 3 3 Fit parents who have been forced to leave their
children in the United States should have access to resources that could
prevent the wrongful termination of their parental rights. Adherence to
the Vienna Convention in this situation would require the United States
to notify the parent's consular post so that the consular officers could
communicate with and provide legal representation to the detained
noncitizen. 2 34 This consular involvement could provide the court with
information about the parent's culture and the conditions in which the
child will be raised if released with the parent upon deportation.23 5
Whichever solution is adopted, one thing is certain: the best interest of
the child standard cannot replace the fitness standard in termination of
parental rights proceedings.
VI. CONCLUSION
Current law requires that the State prove by clear and convincing
evidence that a parent is unfit before the parent's legal relationship with
his or her child may be permanently terminated. This standard appropri-
ately balances the parent's and child's constitutional rights and the
State's duty to protect children from harm. Immigrants' parental rights
are protected by the Constitution to the same degree as the parental
rights of citizen parents; therefore, a parent's country of citizenship
should have no bearing on the termination of parental rights determina-
tion. Allowing a best interest of the child standard to govern termination
proceedings against parents who will likely be deported invites cultural
bias to taint the proceedings, whether such bias is conscious or not. The
fitness standard requires the State to show that the children will be in
danger if they are reunited with their parents and does not permit the
court to terminate a parent's rights based solely on a subjective belief
that the child might be better off in one home as compared to another.
History has demonstrated that preconceived notions about another's
way of life may not only destroy an entire culture, but also adversely
232. Id. at 1495, 1497-98.
233. Id. at 1499; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T.
77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
234. Hall, supra note 87, at 1500.
235. Id. at 1500-01.
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affect the children who are torn from their families and communities.
The children who were shipped from the Eastern city streets were cer-
tainly no better off with the Western farm families. In pursuit of a noble
goal, the child savers sought to give the children a better life, but they
failed, leaving the children to be exploited and abused. Additionally,
before the ICWA was enacted in 1978, one-third of Native American
children were ripped from their families, their tribes, and their cultures
to be raised in White families.2 36 The outsiders, who incidentally had
power over the Native American tribes, mistakenly believed that they
were helping the children. Finally, after hundreds of years of failed
attempts at assimilating the Native Americans, Congress enacted the
ICWA, recognizing that the forced removal Native American children
was reprehensible. By the same token, immigrant parents and their citi-
zen children deserve the same recognition and protection of their rela-
tionship that the Native Americans received under the ICWA.
Terminating a deported parent's rights absent a finding of unfitness
would produce the same type of forced removal that the ICWA was
designed to prevent.
Rather than implement procedures that mirror heavily criticized
historical movements, the federal government should enact further legis-
lation to address and remedy the disconnect between federal immigra-
tion law and state child welfare law. Legislation that recognizes the
disjuncture between these two areas of law and implements procedures
and safeguards to protect the rights of detained and deported parents can
prevent erroneous and wrongful terminations. Courts must consider the
child's express wishes as well as the child's best interest in any proceed-
ing affecting the child, but the current law considers these factors in
termination proceedings only after the court has found that the parent is
unfit. This sequence of events not only recognizes the parent's constitu-
tional right to the care and custody of his or her children, but also
ensures the child's safety and wellbeing. Because it is in keeping with
this established constitutional balance, the fitness standard should be
applied in termination of parental rights proceedings regardless of the
parent's deportation status.
236. Graham, supra note 168, at 2.
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